On May 9, Chinese President Xi Jinping joined Russian President Vladimir Putin at Moscow’s Victory Day parade in Red Square, commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. Xi’s appearance as guest of honour sent a clear signal of Sino-Russian solidarity amid deepening confrontation with the West.

This year’s commemorations went beyond ceremony. Through symbolism, official speeches, and a joint statement marking the occasion, Beijing and Moscow advanced a reframed narrative of the Second World War—one that supports their broader strategic alignment. By presenting themselves as co-architects and custodians of the postwar order, they are instrumentalising history to reinforce a shared worldview, deepen their partnership, and cast the United States as antagonist.

Claiming the Past, Defining the Order

Xi’s appearance at Moscow’s 2025 Victory Day parade was his first since the 70th anniversary celebrations in 2015. At the time, Beijing’s message emphasised peace, reconciliation, and shared sacrifice—framing international cooperation as essential to global stability. The tone was aspirational and outward-looking, shaped in part by the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, which China presented as a vehicle for development and peaceful engagement.

A decade later, the message is sharper and more confrontational. In their joint statement, China and Russia recast the Second World War as a dual-front struggle—led by the Soviet Union in Europe and China in Asia—whose victory laid the foundation for the postwar international order.

Beijing and Moscow position themselves not merely as participants or beneficiaries of the postwar order, but as its co-creators, moral heirs, and rightful guardians. They claim that the core legacy of the war is the UN-centred international system and its founding principles—now under threat and in need of defence. Unnamed actors—clearly referring to the United States and its allies—are accused of distorting history, practising unilateral coercion, and seeking to revise the outcomes of the war.

This framing reverses the conventional Western narrative: China and Russia portray themselves as defenders of international order and multilateralism, while casting the West as revisionist and destabilising.

Recasting China’s Wartime Past

The 2025 framing reflects a longer evolution in Beijing’s historical statecraft—particularly in how the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative of the Second World War has shifted in response to changing domestic priorities and geopolitical needs.

Under Mao Zedong, the dominant frame was revolutionary triumphalism. The war against Japan was folded into the broader story of Communist victory, with the Party cast as the primary force of national salvation. The contributions of the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek—who bore much of the fighting—were downplayed or omitted.

During the Deng Xiaoping era, the official narrative shifted toward victimhood and national humiliation. The Japanese invasion became a symbol of China’s historical suffering, reinforcing the Party’s role as restorer of national dignity during a period of economic reform and ideological transition.

Under Xi Jinping, a new synthesis has taken shape. The war is now recast as a “people’s victory” led by the Party, portrayed as both architect of resistance and inheritor of triumph. While the theme of victimhood remains, it is tempered by an emphasis on victory and agency. This reframing supports China’s bid to be seen not only as a nation that has suffered, but one that has prevailed—and is now progressing toward national rejuvenation.

Since the 2010s, Beijing has pushed to internationalise this narrative—emphasising China’s role as a key contributor to Allied victory and as a founding member of the postwar order. The establishment of commemorative days, expansion of war museums, and coordinated state media and diplomatic messaging all reflect this outward turn. In 2015, Xi’s Moscow visit and China’s own Victory Day parade were used to project China’s global image as a defender of peace.

Aligning Narratives, Uneven Memories

The most striking feature of the 2025 commemorations is their overt geopolitical intent. Beijing and Moscow are not invoking history merely to affirm domestic legitimacy—they are mobilising it in a broader contest over the international order. History is treated as a strategic resource, reinterpreted to support their global posture as self-declared custodians of an order they claim to have built—and now must defend.

A particularly noteworthy development is the closer alignment of historical narratives. The joint statement affirms shared sacrifice, commits to joint commemorations, and pledges archival cooperation. This is the closest China and Russia have come to presenting a unified commemorative front.

Yet the convergence remains asymmetric. China has spent the past decade globalising its wartime narrative, casting itself as both antifascist protagonist and co-founder of the international order. Russia’s memory politics remain centred on the Red Army’s victory in Europe, with little popular recognition of China’s role in the Asia-Pacific.

The joint statement seeks to bridge this gap—acknowledging mutual contributions and institutionalising cooperation. But the alignment is state-driven, reflecting coordinated messaging more than shared historical consciousness.

This asymmetry limits the depth of the convergence, constraining its effectiveness as ideological glue in the broader strategic partnership. Whether this state-driven convergence can foster a deeper alignment of historical memory remains uncertain. Without broader resonance—especially in Russia, where China’s role in the Asia-Pacific theatre remains marginal—the narrative may struggle to extend beyond official discourse.

Selective Remembrance

Asymmetries in historical memory are compounded by selective silences, weakening Beijing and Moscow’s claims to moral authority and shared legacy. The result is a narrative that seeks coherence through omission rather than a full reckoning with historical complexity.