China Tweets #1
Hi folks,
Here is my latest experiment: China Tweets. It is a weekly curated collection of tweets on China-related topics.
As a follower of Chinese current affairs, I find Twitter a valuable tool for gathering information and insights. But the downside of Twitter is that you need to sift through a lot of material for just a few good nuggets.
China Tweets saves you from having to do the sifting.
-Adam
Guiyang Huaguoyuan 贵阳花果园, known as China’s largest residential property, can live more than 500,000 people. pic.twitter.com/rvLbKHoqao
— Tong Bingxue 仝冰雪 (@tongbingxue) July 18, 2022
"Swastikas in downtown Chengdu - History should never be forgotten!" - The Israeli consulate in Chengdu confirmed that a car with Nazi insignia was parked next to their building this week.
— Tuvia Gering 陶文亚 (@GeringTuvia) July 20, 2022
1/6 pic.twitter.com/xeJ3GUaEQh
All of this happened in China this week. A thread. 1/10
— Sofia Horta e Costa (@SofiaHCBBG) July 22, 2022
Payment boycotts spread across the property market. Some suppliers refuse to make good on bank loans until real estate developers pay them. China considers a mortgage grace period for homebuyers. Henan sets up a property bailout fund. 2/10https://t.co/clWZprqIFt
— Sofia Horta e Costa (@SofiaHCBBG) July 22, 2022
What about banks? They'd forfeit $4.6 billion of interest income if China gives homebuyers a temporary mortgage-payment holiday, Citi says. Separately, authorities say they'll repay more victims of China's biggest-ever bank scam. 3/10https://t.co/ULdyfI5uSF
— Sofia Horta e Costa (@SofiaHCBBG) July 22, 2022
Nervous markets. Foreign outflows from Chinese government bonds hit a record in June, the fifth straight month of selling. Bets against the currency are gathering pace. Prices on junk dollar debt are on the brink of an all-time low. 4/10https://t.co/hdAD10X711
— Sofia Horta e Costa (@SofiaHCBBG) July 22, 2022
A flexible growth target. Premier Li Keqiang says “China won’t roll out massive stimulus, issue an excessive amount of money or overdraw the future for an overly high growth target.” Below is what to watch on the Chinese economy this year. 5/10https://t.co/nkgsANwZAE
— Sofia Horta e Costa (@SofiaHCBBG) July 22, 2022
Didi's $1.2 billion fine. The long-awaited decision on Didi - the Uber-like company that pushed ahead with a U.S. IPO last year against China's wishes - at least removes some uncertainty over its future. Shares are up about 30% this week. 6/10https://t.co/UZfErkkiJ5
— Sofia Horta e Costa (@SofiaHCBBG) July 22, 2022
Speaking of corporate behavior: HSBC. The bank has formed a Communist Party committee at its investment banking venture in China, the FT reports. The committees serve as unions and sometimes as a way to install party members in upper management. 7/10https://t.co/rsMBydp06T
— Sofia Horta e Costa (@SofiaHCBBG) July 22, 2022
US, China, Taiwan. Biden and Xi may speak soon. It’s unclear a deal can be reached to avoid the delisting of Chinese stocks from US exchanges, the SEC says. China urges the US to withdraw a plan to sell arms to Taiwan. Pelosi may visit next month. 8/10https://t.co/akEvUrhR7K
— Sofia Horta e Costa (@SofiaHCBBG) July 22, 2022
Macau's Covid Zero casino crash. In 2019 gambling revenue was six times that of Las Vegas. This year Vegas is ahead. Casinos account for 80% of Macau's government income and 1/3 of employment. Casinos are set to reopen this weekend, will anyone come? 9/10https://t.co/zztJSidUfL
— Sofia Horta e Costa (@SofiaHCBBG) July 22, 2022
Money, companies, talent want to leave. An estimated 10,000 wealthy residents are seeking to pull $48b from China this year. Stellantis is halting production of Jeeps in China. Valuations for Bytedance are down at least 25%. HK's talent pool shrinks. 10/10https://t.co/cYA9uf1HIT
— Sofia Horta e Costa (@SofiaHCBBG) July 22, 2022
120 years apart.
— Tong Bingxue 仝冰雪 (@tongbingxue) July 16, 2022
The Forbidden City, Beijing. pic.twitter.com/oKim2Bvttl
1/10
— Michael Pettis (@michaelxpettis) July 21, 2022
Good article on the difficulties China faces on its developing-country lending. "A Financial Times examination of the financial health of the Belt and Road Initiative has uncovered a mountain of non-performing loans."https://t.co/HHYQgXWxt8
2/10
— Michael Pettis (@michaelxpettis) July 21, 2022
I've always been skeptical of the "China debt trap" thesis and think it is far more helpful to view Chinese lending to developing countries as more naïve and inexperienced than nefarious.
3/10
— Michael Pettis (@michaelxpettis) July 21, 2022
This wouldn't be the first time. It seems that whenever a country "goes out" for the first time and makes major investments in developing countries – the US in the 1920s, the USSR in the 1950s, Japan in the 1970s, etc. – it makes the same set of mistakes.
4/10
— Michael Pettis (@michaelxpettis) July 21, 2022
Amid rapid growth and soaring commodity prices It systematically underestimates the risks and, even worse, seriously overestimates the value of its own domestic experiences and strategies.
5/10
— Michael Pettis (@michaelxpettis) July 21, 2022
That is why I have argued for over a decade that after a few years of exuberance and grandiose statements, we would see a period of sobering and unexpected losses followed by rapid retrenchment.https://t.co/gP7JJUiSOp
6/10
— Michael Pettis (@michaelxpettis) July 21, 2022
That seems to be happening. Since the brutal lessons of Venezuela in 2014-15, Chinese lending to developing countries seems to have dropped dramatically. It would have declined even more if it weren't for the need to restructure many of the loans.
7/10
— Michael Pettis (@michaelxpettis) July 21, 2022
At one point the article notes that "these mounting problems do not obscure the fact that the vast construction of infrastructure in many developing countries around the world with Chinese finance has helped to drive development."
8/10
— Michael Pettis (@michaelxpettis) July 21, 2022
Actually infrastructure spending is a cost of growth, not a cause. It doesn't drive development. It accommodates it. It can only be justified if it allows for an increase in workers' productivity that exceeds the cost of the infrastructure.
9/10
— Michael Pettis (@michaelxpettis) July 21, 2022
Otherwise infrastructure spending actually retards growth. The FT indirectly makes this very point by focusing on the absurd Lotus Tower in Colombo. The tower may have generated a lot of economic activity when it was built, but it is turning out to be a waste of money.
10/10
— Michael Pettis (@michaelxpettis) July 21, 2022
That's the important lesson that was missed in Chinese infrastructure spending both at home and abroad. It is important to build infrastructure that is needed to accommodate increases in productivity. In itself infrastructure spending doesn't drive growth.
China’s last emperor Puyi in Tientsin, 1925-1929. pic.twitter.com/oPelBVq12O
— Tong Bingxue 仝冰雪 (@tongbingxue) July 19, 2022
2/ China has nothing to gain from sacrificing its relationship with Russia and joining Western pressure on Moscow to stop the war: it would not mean less pressure on China or eased sanctions from the West, so there is simply no incentive for Beijing to throw Putin under the bus.
— Alexander Gabuev 陳寒士 (@AlexGabuev) July 18, 2022
3/ China’s increased purchase of Russian commodities at steep discounts provides a lifeline for the Kremlin. It's done not because of any desire to help Russia, but because it makes practical sense to China. Other players outside the Western coalition like India act the same way.
— Alexander Gabuev 陳寒士 (@AlexGabuev) July 18, 2022
4/ Russia, meanwhile, is now more than ever on a trajectory to become an increasingly junior partner in the relationship with China. This was always a risk, but now Russia simply doesn’t have any other options, having burned its bridges with the West. This gives Beijing leverage.
— Alexander Gabuev 陳寒士 (@AlexGabuev) July 18, 2022
5/ For example, as Russia tries to gradually cut off gas supplies to the EU in order to pay back for the European sanctions and Western help to Ukraine, some of 🇷🇺 gas once shipped to the EU will go to China instead, and a new pipeline is likely to be built for that in 3-5 years.
— Alexander Gabuev 陳寒士 (@AlexGabuev) July 18, 2022
6/ China will likely get this gas with reduced take-or-pay levels since Russia has no other options. That will add to China’s leverage over other gas suppliers pushing for discounts (Qatar, the U.S.) or threatening to stop buying their gas if they displease Beijing (Australia).
— Alexander Gabuev 陳寒士 (@AlexGabuev) July 18, 2022
7/ Moscow will be increasingly willing to do what Beijing asks, meaning more advanced weapon designs will come China’s way, and more support on issues like 9-dash line etc. This dynamics in 🇨🇳🇷🇺 relations is worrying for the West, and 🇺🇸 doesn't have good tools to address it.
— Alexander Gabuev 陳寒士 (@AlexGabuev) July 18, 2022
The problem with the line "Taiwan was historically part of China" isn't that it is a blatant lie, but that it is problematically simplistic. In the context of news articles, it is almost always used to justify PRC aggression and delegitimize Taiwan's right to self-determination.
— Lev Nachman (@lnachman32) July 22, 2022
Not to hype her book twice, but if people genuinely want to understand the complex relationship different Chinese regimes have had with Taiwan and how they saw Taiwan in the context of Chinese territory, read "Taiwan's Imagined Geography" by Emma Teng. https://t.co/xwGHIkjjZG
— Lev Nachman (@lnachman32) July 22, 2022
Past & Present, 90 years apart, a Hutong in Beijing. pic.twitter.com/aaCJTrMsAx
— Tong Bingxue 仝冰雪 (@tongbingxue) July 20, 2022
1/ I've received questions about how the USG should respond to China's lists of diplomatic demands. My suggestion - push the list back across the table, thank them for the effort of organizing their thinking on their priorities...(thread)https://t.co/jsWio6ux1K via @politico
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 16, 2022
2/ …underscore that major powers don't communicate with each other through lists of demands, and then invite a candid conversation about what matters most to each side and where progress might be possible in addressing each side's respective top objectives and concerns.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 16, 2022
3/ It makes sense for both sides to manage expectations. At the same time, any development of a durable, productive, forthright, mature relationship will require both sides to move beyond exchanging grievances to seriously addressing each other’s top priorities and concerns.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 16, 2022
4/ Beijing's lists are posturing, not diplomacy. Neither side is going to comply with the other's demands. That isn't how major power diplomacy operates. Any progress will be incremental and will require give-and-take. A goal of diplomacy is to take more than you give. END.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 16, 2022
China After Mao, 1976-1983, growing of individual emotions and lifestyles, by Liu Heung Shing. pic.twitter.com/w8ND9BP9XX
— Tong Bingxue 仝冰雪 (@tongbingxue) July 19, 2022
Seems to be a new phrase by which CCP (Xi Jinping) describes the relationship of Xinjiang non-Han people to "Zhonghua" (Chinese) identity, maybe first rolled out in Xi's speech after his recent Xinjiang tour: 中华文明是新疆各民族文化的根脉所在 (1/n) https://t.co/I66m0upbFM
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
In Xi's speech at the 3rd Xinjiang forum in Sept. 2020 (and in other speeches around that time) a different phrase was used: 新疆各民族是中华民族血脉相连的家庭成员, “Every minzu (ethnic group) of Xinjiang is a family-member linked to Chinese (Zhonghua) bloodlines.” 2/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
I pointed out at the time that by evoking "blood" and "family member" this phrase indirectly implied a genetic relationship between the Central Asian peoples now ruled by the CCP and "Zhonghua," i.e. Chinese peoples. 3/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
I don't know if that racialist line has been dropped, but this new one (中华文明 新疆各民族文化的根脉所在 "Chinese [Zhonghua] civilization is the location of the root vein [pulse] of the culture of every minzu in Xinjiang") is still metaphorically biological, if less racial 4/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
On Xi's idea of "Chinese Civilisation", I recommend reading his latest Qiushi article Deepening the Study of the History of the Chinese Civilization (yes, yes, we at Neican are working on a translation)
Not a very common term, 根脉 genmai (root and vein, or root vein, or root and pulse) is frequently used about culture. For example: 对于一个国家和民族而言，传统是文明之根脉。Or 历史是根，文化是脉 (History is the root, culture is the pulse.) (from Baidu translate eg list) 5/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
Elsewhere in the speech Xi again stresses the new PRC melting pot doctrine: 要铸牢中华民族共同体意识 "must firmly forge consciousness of the Zhonghua collectivity." (I don't think translating this along lines of "sense of community of the Chinese nation" quite gets it: 6/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
The Zhonghua collectivity is asserted as a thing in itself, not a "sense" of something--this community (he says) exists; what needs to be forged is the recognition, consciousness of that existing Chinese community. 7/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
This new conciousness is necessary b/c just few years ago it was not taught that Uyghurs have been "Chinese" for all time. From 2015 CCP changed the textbooks it itself had published ca. 2010. Xi has decreed a new history of XJ, even more Sino-centric than past versions. 7.5/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
Thus there's a lot about history and identity elsewhere in the speech: 要教育引导广大干部群众正确认识新疆历史特别是民族发展史 "must educate and guide broad officials and masses to correctly recognize Xinjiang history, especially history of ethnic development." 8/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
This tells everybody get with the new program: the various minzu of Xinjiang are all Chinese, developed from and as part of what Xi calls the "Zhonghua" (now ubiquitous as generic, ahistorical cultural term equivalent to the western-language term "China") 9/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
There's many more cautions in the speech about historical view, cultural identity, and how that must be promoted and publicized: 构建展现 . . . 新疆同内地各民族交往交流交融历史事实的话语体系和有效载体 (trans. in next) 10/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
"must construct and promulgate the actual discursive system and effective vehicle regarding communications, exchanges and contacts between every minzu of Xinjiang and the heartland." 11/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
Construct a discursive system!!! Xi's been reading Foucault again. 12/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
And in the one place he alludes indirectly to the massive international criticism, Xi calls for this discourse to be widely propagandized internationally in response: 要多层次、全方位、立体式开展涉疆对外宣传，完善“请进来”工作，讲好中国新疆故事。12.5/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
"Must roll out multi-level, omni-directional, three dimensional propaganda about Xinjiang directed abroad, perfect the work of 'inviting in' [bringing selected groups on XJ propaganda tours], and tell the Chinese Xinjiang story well." 13/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
I can remember in the early 2000s, XJ cadres were cautioned against "internationalizing the Xinjiang problem." Well, it's been well and truly internationalized now! The new information agenda is damage control, trying to project a different narrative abroad.
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
The front in the information war remains active. This is of course an indirect admission that Xi's policies have NOT made a good impression abroad. In fact, the colonial nature of CCP rule in Xinjiang is now widely apparent. So selling XJ remains a top ranked priority. 14/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
Most people in the world five years ago didn't know what Xinjiang was; now they know it as a Chinese colony, whether using that word or not. It is quite remarkable that in what some media have portrayed as Xi's victory lap in XJ, he devotes so many words to 15/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
calling for a narrative about history, culture, identity of XJ's non-Han peoples to be "constructed," internalized by cadres and masses domestically, propagandized to the wider world. 16/n
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
So get ready for more of that "multi-level, omni-directional, three dimensional propaganda" which PRC does so well: sure to involve smiling natives in costume and those cute foreign Youtube influencers eating noodles on their CCP-paid holidays. (end)
— James Millward 米華健 (@JimMillward) July 16, 2022
When the nostalgia for posthistory kicks pic.twitter.com/fqa8oNZAfO
— Anton Jäger (@AntonJaegermm) July 18, 2022
1. The period of China championing urbanization at the expense of rural areas is well and truly over. The new narrative is: It is time for urban CN to repay its debt to rural CN (反哺 is the common metaphor).
— David Fishman (@pretentiouswhat) July 22, 2022
Poverty alleviation, New Countryside, part of this same playbook.
2. Rural areas in China will not die out & only live in museums.
— David Fishman (@pretentiouswhat) July 22, 2022
Nor will they all seal themselves in amber, waiting for urban residents to play disney farmpark.
They are trying to fabricate a linked urban-rural structure for 21st century China, a model I find very compelling.
3. In some ways they look like a village version of centrally-planned cities. If you build it, they will come.
— David Fishman (@pretentiouswhat) July 22, 2022
But this means the rural areas are competing to retain/attract the same people that small cities like Jishou are also targeting. Can both fill up? There will be waste..
4. New Countryside, just like the construction of other new infrastructure in China (no matter whether it's dams, highways, or railways) means someone's house is getting wrecked.
— David Fishman (@pretentiouswhat) July 22, 2022
Sometimes this is a windfall for the owner. Other times it's a burden & material/emotional loss.
5. As with everything in China, decentralized execution creates opportunities for local bad actors to take advantage.
— David Fishman (@pretentiouswhat) July 22, 2022
If only 1% of local developers/officials are rotten, that's still millions that are harmed, even as other hundreds of millions benefit.
(It's more than 1%)
6. As with everything everywhere, IT'S COMPLEX. In this program's ideals, realities, successes & failures, everyone will find something to like...and dislike.
— David Fishman (@pretentiouswhat) July 22, 2022
But anyone who tries to give you an opinion on it without ACKNOWLEDGING the complexities is doing you a disservice.
7. They're just a few years into a plan that will take 3 decades. There's time to figure out what's working, what's not, & make changes - and I believe they will (for what they think are problems anyway).
— David Fishman (@pretentiouswhat) July 22, 2022
e.g. I think more systems for ensuring rural rights are still needed.
8. Overall, I support the balanced urban/rural model embodied by New Countryside, even if some of the execution has issues.
— David Fishman (@pretentiouswhat) July 22, 2022
China is far from the only country experiencing rural withering. Most can't implement a policy exactly like this, but there are lessons here.
P.S. I would like to acknowledge the work of post-doc researcher Xu Hongzhang at ANU, whose paper on this topic was super valuable for info sourcing and organizing my ideas in this thread.
— David Fishman (@pretentiouswhat) July 22, 2022
Read it here:https://t.co/OQ6BcmTxGX
goddammit I can't believe how long I spent drafting this thread, only to forget to add my header image to the first tweet
— David Fishman (@pretentiouswhat) July 22, 2022
Multiple things can be true about Pelosi visiting Taiwan:
— Lev Nachman (@lnachman32) July 20, 2022
1. The US should be able to send officials to Taiwan to show support, and the PRC should not set the US's terms for visits.
2. At this moment, it is possible that her trip adds more risk than it detracts.
To qualify #2 - it may increase risk because of how the PRC will threaten Taiwan in response. The aggressor here is the PRC, not the US, which makes the situation particularly frustrating when evaluating whether or not Pelosi's visit is in Taiwan's best interest at this moment.
— Lev Nachman (@lnachman32) July 20, 2022
Biden's negative remarks on the notion of a Pelosi visit are probably because of plans for him to have a call with Xi Jinping soon. But as usual, it would be helpful for him to have more measured comments rather than just roll with something off the cuff that creates issues
— Brian Hioe 丘琦欣 (@brianhioe) July 21, 2022
Like seriously? He said,“Well, I think that the military thinks it’s not a good idea right now. But I don’t know what the status of it is.”
— Brian Hioe 丘琦欣 (@brianhioe) July 21, 2022
It gives too much credence to the unrealistic notion that China would attack Taiwan in an imminent timeframe--including over a Pelosi visit
1/ I expect @SpeakerPelosi will proceed with reported plans to visit Taiwan in August. Nobody can credibly argue Pelosi is soft in the face of PRC pressure. She has a long and clear record on China. (Thread)
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
2/ That said, there has been debate in Washington over Pelosi’s trip. Proponents of her visit argue Taiwan merits US support and Pelosi shouldn't buckle to Beijing's pressure. Skeptics suggest trip carries more risks than benefit.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
3/ The risk is that Beijing feels its concerns over Taiwan are not being heard and that it may use Pelosi's visit as a basis to take physical actions to restore the credibility of its concerns. Beijing wants to stanch expanding US-Taiwan contacts and growing security assistance.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
4/ Given the unrelenting pressure Taiwan has come under from Beijing, the US should find meaningful ways to show its support for Taiwan. Such steps should be undertaken with a goal of maximizing benefit while minimizing risk and harm, including toward Taiwan.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
5/ As a matter of US policy, America’s abiding interest is to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. All decisions should be guided by this objective.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
6/ Given this, there may be value in reconsidering timing of Pelosi’s trip. If she travels in early August, she will elicit a maximalist PRC response that TW will absorb. Timing is adjacent to PLA Day, around PRC leadership retreat to Beidaihe, and in run-up to Party Congress.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
7/ Chinese leaders likely will err on side of overreaction if trip proceeds in August. To do otherwise would be to risk being labeled weak at a sensitive moment. Later in year, Party Congress will be in rearview, there may be transition underway in House leadership...
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
7/ Chinese leaders likely will err on side of overreaction if trip proceeds in August. To do otherwise would be to risk being labeled weak at a sensitive moment. Later in year, Party Congress will be in rearview, there may be transition underway in House leadership...
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
8/ Pelosi could provide public support for Taiwan in August and pledge to visit at future date. No matter what happens in midterms, she will be Speaker until January 3. She conceivably could visit as Speaker at end of year. That timing likely would generate less heat.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
9/ Some will argue US should not factor in PRC response, doing so will invite and embolden future PRC bullying, and US must protect its ability to have meaningful dialogue with Taiwan. I support preserving close US-Taiwan coordination. This is not a problem now.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
10/ There are strong, active US-Taiwan channels across all elements of the relationship. There has been a high tempo of recent Congressional engagement with Taiwan. A high-level bipartisan delegation of former officials led by Admiral Mullen recently visited Taiwan…
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
11/ The stakes for a visit by Speaker are too high to be driven by the August Congressional recess calendar. Sometimes discretion is the better part of valor. Speaker Pelosi could show support for Taiwan at less risk later in year than in early August. END.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) July 22, 2022
The Tibetan bride and groom in Dege county德格县，SW China’s Sichuan Province, 2022. pic.twitter.com/lHMdIH4jtD
— Tong Bingxue 仝冰雪 (@tongbingxue) July 19, 2022